The relationship between Mexico and Texas is in dire need of reassessment, given the chasm between the reality of the countries’ economic and cultural relationship and the political rhetoric that surrounds it.
Brief may be found in its entirety by clicking here.
Friday, May 15, 2015 (3:00 PM – 5:00 PM)
Hillcrest Appellate Courtroom, Underwood Law Library (map)
Irene Hirano Inouye, President, U.S.-Japan Council
Irene Hirano Inouye is President of the U.S.-Japan Council, a position she has held since the founding of the Council in late 2008. Through the U.S.-Japan Council, she also administers the TOMODACHI Initiative, a public-private partnership, with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, born out of support for Japan’s recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake. The TOMODACHI Initiative invests in the next generation of Japanese and American leaders through educational and cultural exchanges and leadership programs. She is the former President and Founding CEO of the Japanese American National Museum in Los Angeles, a position she held for twenty years. A recipient of bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Public Administration from the University of Southern California, Ms. Hirano Inouye has extensive experience in non-profit administration, community education and public affairs with culturally diverse communities nationwide. Ms. Hirano Inouye’s current professional and community activities include serving as Trustee and immediate past Chair, Ford Foundation; Trustee and immediate past Chair, Kresge Foundation; Trustee, Washington Center; Trustee, Independent Sector, and Vice-Chair, Smithsonian Institution Asian Pacific American Center. Her previous positions include serving as former Chair Board of Directors of the American Association of Museums, Board Member, National Trust for Historic Preservation, Member, National Board Smithsonian Institution, Advisory Board, Smithsonian National Museum of American History, Member Toyota Corporation’s Diversity Advisory Board, member, Business Advisory Board of Sodexho Corporation, President’s Committee on the Arts and Humanities by Presidential appointment, and Chair California Commission on the Status of Women. She was married to the late U.S. Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii.
Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Commander of the Pacific Fleet & Tower Center Senior Fellow, SMU
Admiral Patrick M. Walsh is currently Senior Vice President, iSIGHT Partners, and General Manager of iSIGHT Partners’ ThreatSPACE® business unit, a live-fire cyber range and training facility where cyber security organizations earn hands-on experience in responding to cyber attacks.
Admiral Walsh, a Dallas native, retired from the Navy in 2012 after serving as the 59th Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He is a two-time Exercise RIMPAC leader, acting as the multinational strike group commander in 2004, and as overall operational leader in 2010. With a 35-year career in training and leading joint forces, Walsh enables iSIGHT Partners to deliver specialized cyber training to large-scale and joint cyber security response operations.
After earning his Naval Aviator designation in 1979, Admiral Walsh went on to lead combat units at virtually every level of operation including squadron, wing, strike group, fleet, and regional fleet command. Most recently, he commanded U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet, while also commanding the Combined Maritime Forces conducting Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and maritime security operations in the Central Command area of responsibility. He served as vice chief of Naval Operations and as a special assistant to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as a White House Fellow. He also chaired the Department of Leadership, Ethics and Law at the U.S. Naval Academy.
In 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates selected Walsh to conduct a 30-day review of operations at the U.S. Detention Center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, following President Obama’s order that the detention center be closed.
Admiral Walsh is serving currently a Senior Fellow at the John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University.
He is a 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, and holds Master of Arts and Doctorate degrees from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He also graduated with honors from Jesuit College Preparatory in Dallas, and was the second student in the sixty-year history of the school to receive both the Distinguished Graduate and Distinguished Alumnus awards. His numerous military career awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Air Medal w/ Combat V, Navy Commendation Medal w/ Combat V, Navy, and the Presidential Service Badge.
Anny Wong, Tower Center Research Fellow, SMU
Anny Wong joined the Tower Center in January 2013. Prior to moving to Dallas in the Fall of 2012, she was a political scientist at RAND Corporation in Arlington, Virginia, and conducted research on national security, human capital, international development, and science and technology policy for a variety of clients including the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and Japan’s National Institute for Science and Technology. She continued to consult at RAND, the World Bank, Freedom House, and other organizations, covering economics and politics in Japan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania. She a board member of the Japan-American Society of Dallas/Fort Worth and recently chaired a panel on Japanese and international business investments in North Texas at the Japan Update Program on February 13, 2015. Anny was an East-West Center graduate fellow in Honolulu, obtained her doctoral degree in political science from University of Hawai’i at Manoa, and has worked, lived, studied, and traveled widely across Asia.
Moderator | Hiroki Takeuchi, Associate Professor & Director of Sun & Star Program on Japan East Asia, Tower Center, SMU
Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Sun & Star Program on Japan and East Asia in the Tower Center, at Southern Methodist University. He Received his B.A. of Economics from Keio University in Japan, his M.A. of Asian Studies from University of California at Berkeley, and his Ph.D. of Political Science from University of California at Los Angeles. Previously, he taught at UCLA as a faculty fellow of the Political Science Department and at Stanford University as a postdoctoral teaching fellow of the Public Policy Program. His research and teaching interests include Chinese and Japanese politics, comparative authoritarianism, and political economy and international relations of East Asia, as well as applying game theory to political science. He is the author of Tax Reform in Rural China: Revenue, Resistance, and Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2014). He is also a regular contributor to Foresight, Japanese online journal.
This news story first appeared on May 13, 2015 . For more information, click here.
Robert Jordan is Diplomat in Residence and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the John G. Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 2001 to 2003. His memoir, Desert Diplomat: Inside Saudi Arabia Following 9/11, will be published by Potomac Books in July 2015.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia: Why the Saudi King Snubbed President Obama
By Robert W. Jordan. This story first appeared in Time, May 13, 2015.
There have been too many recent policy disagreements about the Middle East
King Salman of Saudi Arabia has declined an invitation to participate in President Barack Obama’s Gulf summit meeting in Camp David this week. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia are working to minimize the fallout from this decision, but from the Saudi standpoint, this summit does not hold much attraction. Only two other heads of the Gulf states are attending. Two are in poor health, but the other non-attendees may be following Riyadh’s lead. Some of this reticence may derive from a festering series of policy disagreements that contribute to seriously frayed relations with the Gulf monarchies.
In their view, Obama was surprisingly willing to promote the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, declaring that it was time for him to go and insisting on being on the “right side of history.” Arab monarchs began to wonder whether, if this could happen to Mubarak, would this administration decide that they, too, were on the wrong side of history? They then witnessed the president’s about-face on Syria, backing away from even minimal military action against Bashar Al Assad’s use of chemical weapons. Most worrisome is the impending agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, which portends a closer American relationship with the perceived archenemy of the Gulf Arabs. Removing sanctions against Iran and freeing up billions in funds raises the threat level perceived by the Saudis and their neighbors, who fear a growing encirclement by Iran and its proxies, to say nothing of the prospect of a nuclear capable Iran that would dramatically change the balance of power in the Middle East.
Presidential summits are often all about deliverables. When then-Crown Prince Abdullah met with President George Bush in Crawford, Texas, in 2002, Abdullah wanted to demonstrate to the president, through the use of videotapes, the carnage he believed was being inflicted upon the Palestinian people by Israel. He also wanted to secure the release of Yasser Arafat from his confinement by the Israelis in Ramallah, along with a list of other items. During the summit, we worked through the issues and reached resolution on a number of them. The president took the crown prince for a ride around the ranch in his pickup truck, and the two returned with a stronger personal bond that was occasionally reinforced and served them well throughout the remainder of the Bush presidency.
Times have changed. The Arab Spring has disintegrated into chaos. Alliances that endured for decades have frayed at best. The American pivot away from the Middle East is seen as abandonment in a time of crisis. Top-level personal relationships have not jelled. A nuclear accord with Iran offers little assurance of compliance, detection, or enforcement. Also, reaffirmation of the American security umbrella, perhaps the main deliverable at this summit, may be a bridge too far.
UAE Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba has asked for something more concrete than a “gentleman’s agreement.” Yet the most advanced aircraft and weapons systems would not be available without Congressional approval, where determination to maintain Israel’s “qualitative edge” might well prove a roadblock. Absent a treaty, even written guarantees of American protection for the Gulf may seem hollow in light of recent performance, and would not be binding on future administrations. A more muscular missile defense system may be the best the Americans can offer.
The icing on the cake may be Obama’s intention to lecture the heads of state (or their designees) on reform. In an interview with the New York Times he asserted that the Saudis and other allies should note threats from within, “populations that, in some cases, are alienated, youth that are underemployed, an ideology that is destructive and nihilistic, and in some cases, a belief that there are no legitimate political outlets for grievances.” While these concerns are well-founded and need attention, if this is part of the agenda, some leaders may find reason to pass. A trip to the Camp David woodshed will be about as welcome as a trip to the dentist.
Ambassador Richard L. Armitage delivered the keynote speech at the opening dinner of the Sun & Star Symposium 2015, hosted by SMU’s John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies. Highlights of his long career in public service include a five-year stint as Deputy Secretary of State, the role of Special Emissary to Jordan during the Gulf War, and various positions in the Department of Defense. These high-level roles are compounded with his on-the-ground experiences during his three tours of duty in Vietnam, time as Defense Attaché to the Republic of Vietnam, and key role in orchestrating the evacuation of over 30,000 South Vietnamese by boat to the Philippines after the fall of Saigon. Drawing on this political gravitas, Armitage delivered a clear message regarding the future of American foreign policy by exploring the history of American involvement in the Middle East and Asia during his time working in various positions in the US government. In particular, he focused on relations with Japan, China, and South Korea. His remarks addressed the conference’s theme, “Waiting for the Rising Sun: Japanese New Nationalism and Beyond,” and also clarified his claim that President Obama’s current pivot of focus from the Middle East to Asia has been undertaken too hastily. As such, he contends that America needs to develop cultural and economic ties, not just our security interests in the region.
Armitage outlined numerous problems like the ceaseless conflicts in the Middle East which have hindered the successful pivot of the focus of American foreign policy to Asia. He highlighted the importance of changing focus on the basis of Asia’s growing importance, not because American wishes to exit Afghanistan and Iraq. He focused on the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a key next step for American foreign policy makers. When questioned about his views on the TPP, Armitage identified the present need for a tighter alliance between America and its partners in the region. According to this logic, when the US and Japan agree on the numerous points of debate, other major players like Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and New Zealand will enter into the agreement. As such, the economic successes of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would be replicable on a larger scale throughout the Pacific region.
Because, as Armitage said, “… a coalition of Asian nations cannot stand up to China without the United States,” President Obama and his successors ought to curate US influence in the region to curb the oversized growth of China. He contended that President Obama should start by urging the closer collaboration of South Korea and Japan, America’s foremost Asian partners. While decades of detrimental actions from all sides like the Japanese treatment of South Korea during its occupation in the Second World War have led the present animosity between Tokyo and Seoul, goals like competing with China’s growing economic dominance and containing North Korea provide common ground over which South Korea and Japan can form the missing piece of the strong triangular relationship between these two players and the US. Accordingly, Japan’s current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, must resist the newly-emerging nationalist sentiments in his country, lest the improvement of their relation with South Korea regress.
Looking to the future, Armitage called for the deliberate strengthening of US relations with its partners in East Asia, the most critical being Japan. He stated that the US-Japan relationship not only holds significance for its established economic and cultural ties, but for the critical role Japan plays in the American defense strategy. Japan fits into current American grand strategy because of its hosting of enormous US military bases in a region critical to numerous American goals like the protection of our commercial interests and our Asian allies. As evidence that the US-Japan military relationship will continue to strengthen, he cited a recent joint training exercise by the US Marine Corps and the Japan Self-Defense Forces which “… had retaking an island as its unclassified, stated objective.” China and other potentially threatening nations in Asia will likely view these exercises as a declaration by the US that it will not sit by if Chinese forces invade the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This thorough training acts as an unfortunate, but altogether necessary contingency for the Japanese and American governments in light of recently-increasing tensions over these numerous small, uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. Prime Minister Abe and President Obama are thereby in agreement concerning the importance and validity of the Japanese claim.
While the heated military realities concerning the aforementioned island dispute might result in direct confrontation, Armitage called attention to a far-more preferable alternative. He said that “… territories cannot be shared, but resources can be.” The oil deposits in the waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are the fundamental reason for the three-way conflict between Japan, China, and Taiwan, but also provide a solution. The development and employment of this windfall of natural resources would benefit the three energy-hungry players who all claim a stake in the territory. While acknowledging the emotional and historical tensions between these Asian neighbors, Armitage claimed that the way forward consists of poly-lateral development of relations, as opposed to the current trend whereby every major Asian player closely cultivates their direct relationship with America, but do not extend the same desire for positive expansion to their relationships with each other.
In summation, Armitage recognized the significant barriers to the creation of stronger political, military, and economic ties between America and the major Asian players, but set out his optimistic thoughts for the future. Many of the countries involved share identical interests such as the fostering of higher levels of trade with the United States. He identified the President as uniquely situated as the power-broker of East Asia thanks to the long-standing utmost importance of American business and military investments in the region. As such, he predicts a bright future assuming the President slows his haste to pivot to Asia, and that America can wield its sizable power skillfully.
Ryan is a first-year from Wilton, Connecticut and is majoring in political science and international studies with minors in Spanish and history. At SMU, he is a member of the University Honors Program, the Hilltop Scholars Program, the Career Development Ambassadors, and the Kappa Sigma Fraternity. Ryan plans to pursue a career with the US government after graduation.
The Foreign Policy Essay: The Danger of Politicized Intelligence after a Nuclear Deal
By Joshua Rovner. This story first appeared in Lawfare, May 10, 2015.
Editor’s Note: Part of the job of intelligence officials is to give bad news to policymakers. But should officials at times soften their assessments or otherwise pick their battles in order to maintain the access to policymakers that is vital for intelligence to be relevant? Joshua Rovner of Southern Methodist University explores the Iran nuclear deal in this context, warning of the temptation of what he calls the “soft politicization” of intelligence and the risks for both intelligence and policymakers of doing so.
Secret intelligence is playing a public role in the ongoing debate over the Iran nuclear deal. If the deal is finalized in June, Iran will sacrifice much of its existing uranium enrichment capabilities in return for lifting some economic sanctions and will have to accept an intrusive inspections regime to verify its compliance for more than a decade. The presence of inspectors will create new opportunities for intelligence collection: Not only will intelligence agencies benefit from inspection reports dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, but they will be free to explore other areas of Iran’s scientific and associated industrial infrastructure.
Obama administration officials have expressed confidence that the intelligence community will be able to watch Iran closely, and the intelligence community has returned the compliment. In a recent public appearance, CIA Director John Brennan expressed satisfaction that Iran had made so many concessions and applauded U.S. diplomats for securing a deal that was “as solid as you can get.” There is no reason to doubt Brennan’s sincerity. Indeed, while relations between U.S. policymakers and intelligence leaders are sometimes fractious, the two sides are on the same page when it comes to Iran. Declassified U.S. estimates are broadly consistent with administration statements on Iran’s nuclear progress. Since 2007, the intelligence community has assessed that Iran does not have an active nuclear weapons program, but that it is committed to maintaining its enrichment capability. While some hawks have criticized these estimates, there is nothing to suggest that they were disputed by President Bush or President Obama. And if intelligence on Iran is as good policymakers believe, then there is no reason the intelligence community would worry about its own ability to monitor Iranian compliance.
But this synergy between intelligence and policy may not last forever. What will happen, for instance, if the intelligence community discovers that Iran is cheating? Having staked itself to the nuclear deal, the administration may be reluctant or unable to accept this kind of bad news. Worse yet, the intelligence community will be under pressure to report on Iranian activities in public, given that policymakers used intelligence as a major selling point in the U.S. ability to verify compliance. Instead of keeping intelligence under wraps, policymakers will be tempted to politicize it by pressuring officials to report findings that are aligned with their own views.
At this point intelligence officials will face a difficult choice. On the one hand, they can push back and resist pressure to change the tone or substance of their estimates. At the same time, they might worry about spending all their political capital in one shot, leaving them isolated and pushed out of the policy process. As in any advisory relationship, intelligence-policy relations are iterative. However much intelligence officials would like to speak truth to power today, they fear the price will be losing influence in the future. Iran is not the only game in town, of course, and intelligence officials presumably want a seat at the table in discussions of issues ranging from counterterrorism to great power politics. For this reason they may engage in “soft politicization” by toning down their conclusions or making it appear as if there are a range of equally plausible interpretations from the same underlying evidence. If this occurs, policymakers will be able to claim that they made decisions on the basis of the best available information.
Intelligence officials have often yielded to the temptation to soft-peddle estimates that cut against policy views. It is not hard to understand why. Confronting policymakers with bad news seems like a recipe for losing access and influence, especially when intelligence findings challenge the logic of policy decisions. “Outright pandering clearly crosses the line,” Columbia University’s Richard Betts writes. “But what about a decision simply not to poke a policymaker in the eye, to avoid confrontation, to get a better hearing for a negative view by softening its presentation when a no-compromise argument would be certain to provoke anger and rejection?” Moreover, some issues are more important than others, so it makes little sense to alienate policymakers on relatively minor issues. If it is true that intelligence chiefs have a finite stockpile of political capital, they should spend it wisely.
Engaging in this kind of soft politicization might seem like common sense. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that it actually works.
Consider the case of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, who on more than one occasion bent to policy pressure in order to keep intelligence from becoming irrelevant to the policy process. In 1969, for instance, the Nixon administration leaned on Helms to exaggerate the capabilities of a new Soviet missile while it was trying to secure Senate approval of a new missile-defense system. Even though many analysts were skeptical of Soviet capabilities, Helms intervened to ensure that published estimates were consistent with the administration’s public position. He also appeared before Congress alongside the Secretary of Defense as a show of support. As he explained later, “I was not prepared to stake the Agency’s entire position on this one issue… I was convinced we would have lost the argument with the Nixon administration, and that in the process the Agency would have been permanently damaged.” Unfortunately for Helms, his action did little to improve his position or the standing of the intelligence community, which was increasingly excluded from high-level discussions. Helms was unceremoniously fired in 1972, and the Board of National Estimates, which had once been the focal point for intelligence community analysis, was dissolved in 1973.
The case of DCI George Tenet is a more recent cautionary tale. Following the perceived intelligence failure that led to the September 11 attacks, Tenet worked hard to restore the Bush administration’s confidence in the intelligence community. At the outset this meant moving aggressively against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, but Tenet also came under pressure to help the administration make the public case against Iraq in 2002-2003. Although he was well aware of analysts’ doubts about the Iraqi threat, he chose to declassify intelligence that was consistent with the president’s claim that Iraq was a “grave and gathering danger.” These efforts to mollify the administration proved to be futile. In the aftermath of the March 2003 invasion, when it became clear that Iraq possessed no real weapons of mass destruction, relations between the White House and the intelligence community broke down completely. Policymakers claimed that shoddy intelligence analyses were responsible for their false claims about Iraqi capabilities. Intelligence officials accused the administration of bullying them into exaggerating the threat. And Tenet himself accused administration officials of feeding stories to credulous reporters to shift the blame to the intelligence community. He resigned one year later.
What should we draw from these cases? For intelligence officials, the main lesson is to stop trying to curry favor by softening estimates. In the last decade the U.S. intelligence community has weathered repeated controversies, not because it has played politics but because it has performed well. If it detects Iranian cheating in the aftermath of the nuclear deal, it should say so bluntly, even if this means upsetting policymakers who invested so much in the effort. The long-term consequences of soft politicization far outweigh the short-term discomfort of being honest.
For policymakers, the lesson is to take intelligence out of the spotlight. Using intelligence to sell the Iran deal will reinforce the expectation that future assessments will also be public. This will create a temptation to pressure intelligence agencies to make sure their findings are consistent with administration statements, and intelligence officials might tailor their findings so they are inoffensive. The result will be mushy conclusions useful to no one. Intelligence on Iran is very solid today, and intelligence-policy relations are healthy. The best thing the administration can do to preserve this happy status quo is to remove secret intelligence from public view.
Did the New Spooks on the Block Really Fix U.S. Intelligence?
By Joshua Rovner, Austin Long. This story first appeared in Foreign Policy, April 27, 2015.
For decades intelligence reformers sought to centralize the U.S. intelligence community in a single office with real power over budgets, personnel, and operations. Ten years ago they finally got their wish. Following an intense congressional fight, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) set up shop in April 2005 with high expectations. The office was supposed to ensure the kind of inter-agency coordination that was supposedly missing before the 9/11 attacks. It was to be the fulcrum of sharing and collaboration among agencies with long histories of mutual suspicion and occasional disdain. Ultimately it sought to unify a sprawling constellation of civilian and military agencies into “fully integrated intelligence community” that would “inform decisions made from the White House to the foxhole.” Has it achieved these goals? Has it improved national security against terrorist attacks? Has it led to intelligence on other issues and improved the quality of intelligence-policy relations? The 10-year anniversary of ODNI offers a good opportunity to evaluate its performance. Understanding its strengths and weaknesses is particularly important today, because the current push for further reforms is based on the notion that ODNI model has succeeded. Whether these recommendations make sense depends in large part on how we understand ODNI’s history. Writing for Shadow Government last week, Michael Allen and Stephen Slick argued that ODNI has generally succeeded, though they begin by noting that in some ways it is still too early to judge. In the last decade, for instance, rising intelligence budgets have mostly eased the burden on the director to make hard resource decisions among competing agencies. But on the whole they conclude that the office has successfully promoted intelligence integration, which critics argue was one of the main problems before 9/11, and they urge future policymakers to support its effort. “The alternative,” they write, “is backsliding into old habits that may result in weakened collection, information hoarding, and renewed tribalism.” To be sure, the intelligence community has a lot to be proud of over the last decade. It played an important role in destroying the original al Qaeda organization that was responsible for 9/11. It developed a raft of new collection capabilities at a time of extraordinary technological change. It supported military campaigns in two wars and conducted its own operations in several others. It also invested heavily in tracking nuclear proliferation and keeping a close eye on emerging nuclear powers like Iran. Policymakers have quietly expressed satisfaction with these efforts. But it is not clear ODNI deserves the credit. Most of the effort to dismantle Osama bin Laden’s organization occurred in the years immediately following 9/11. Indeed, by the time ODNI opened for business in April 2005, most of al Qaeda’s leaders were on the run, in prison, or dead. Moreover, much of the war on terrorism has been spearheaded by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism and Special Activities Centers along with the military’s Joint Special Operations Command, so it makes little sense to judge ODNI by progress in the war on terrorism. What about warning? This is a more important criterion, given that ODNI was established explicitly to improve coordination so that terrorists could not slip through the seams between different intelligence agencies. Allen and Slick argue that one of the most important elements of intelligence reform was the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) housed within ODNI, which “plays a crucial role in merging terror threat information from all sources.” Our conversations with policymakers and intelligence officials suggest that it has been largely successful, and President Obama has directed the creation of a new cybersecurity center based on the NCTC. Rather than being revolutionary, however, the NCTC was an outgrowth of a pre-existing organization called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which was in place more than a year before the intelligence reform legislation that led to the creation of ODNI. Moreover, it is unclear why NCTC requires a Director of National Intelligence. NCTC’s success is much more a result of taking the lead in managing strategy and policy for counterterrorism rather than intelligence integration per se. This management role is intrinsically important, and for an ongoing global campaign like counterterrorism it is beyond the limited capacity of the National Security Council staff. Yet managing strategy and policy for a specific issue area does not require an ODNI and its attendant bureaucracy. Indeed, the relationship between the national centers (NCTC, the National Counterproliferation Center, and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center) and the ODNI headquarters staff sometimes creates unnecessary problems. Rather than facilitating coordination, the additional layer of bureaucracy can create friction. It is entirely possible that the centers would perform at least as well — and perhaps even better — without ODNI. Perhaps we are being too critical. After all, it is a fact that the United States has not suffered another 9/11- scale attack, which seems to suggest that the major aspect of intelligence reform has worked. It is impossible to know whether better warning procedures are responsible, however, because al Qaeda was decimated before the reforms were implemented. Al Qaeda was unique among terrorist organizations, both in terms of its ambitions and capabilities. Few if any other groups had the wherewithal to pull off the same kind of spectacular violence during the time that ODNI was getting up and running. It may have implemented reasonable reforms to improve warning, but the United States was unlikely to suffer a major attack even if it hadn’t. In any case, there are reasons to believe that the “failure of coordination” argument is overstated. There was quite a lot of coordination before 9/11, and the failures were mainly due to human error rather than poor organizational design. It is also worth considering the unexpected by-products of the drive for more sharing and coordination that has been central to the ODNI story. While it is understandable that analysts have easier access to information, there is a danger that pooling information for common use may create a greater danger for major breeches. Would Edward Snowden, a contractor, have been able to steal so many classified documents if not for a decade’s worth of exhortation to share? Ultimately, the major successes in U.S. counterterrorism after 9/11 were not due to intelligence reorganization but a change in policy. Before the attacks, U.S. policy was unfocused and risk averse. After the attacks policymakers took an intense interest in destroying al Qaeda and were willing to risk a great deal of blood and treasure in the process. Nearly a decade ago we argued that 9/11 was a national failure rather than an intelligence failure. In the 1990s, politicians and the general public took the threat of terrorist attack much less seriously than many in the intelligence community. The past decade has been radically different. It is this change, rather than ODNI’s rearranging of the bureaucratic deck chairs, that explains the lack of successful attacks.
By Joshua Rovner, The National Interest, April 16, 2015.
The nascent U.S.-Iran nuclear deal seeks to diminish Iran’s nuclear program in return for relaxing sanctions. Advocates of the deal highlight the intrusive inspections regime that will monitor Iranian compliance. Some have also noted that the inspections regime createsnew opportunities for intelligence gathering, including the chance to scrutinize Iran’s manufacturing base, not just its nuclear facilities. New inspections will also cover the whole nuclear fuel cycle, which means that Iran will have to construct a fully parallel covert program if it wants tobeat the inspectors. This would make it easier for intelligence to detect cheating.
Critics, however, worry that the intelligence community has not kept up with Iranian developments over the last decade, despite the fact that the Iran’s nuclear program has been the focus of international scrutiny. They charge that intelligence agencies have been naïve, vulnerable to surprise, and forced to backtrack from their embarrassing blunders.
None of these claims are correct. Contrary to popular views, the intelligence community has been quite successful in tracking Iran’s nuclear program.
Consider the 2007National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program, which provoked a burst of criticism as soon as the summary judgments were declassified. Henry Kissinger called it a “policy conjecture” masquerading as a sober estimate. The Wall Street Journal called it a “fiasco.” Former House Intelligence Committee Chairman Peter Hoekstra called it a “piece of trash.”
In fact, the NIE was accurate and prescient. It concluded that before 2003, Iran had an organized nuclear weapons program, but that it had disbanded the formal effort under international pressure. There is no evidence this was wrong or that Iran had resuscitated work on weaponization, though laboratory scale research would behard to detect. More importantly, the estimate concluded that Iran was continuing to install enrichment centrifuges and work on related technologies. This was the NIE’s critical if overlooked conclusion, because the process of accumulating fissile material is the most demanding part of becoming a nuclear power. The estimate concluded that Iran would be “technically capable of producing enough [highly enriched uranium] for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.” ByNovember 2013, Iran had accumulated more than enough uranium for a bomb if further enriched.
Two years after the NIE controversy, Iran disclosed the existence of the Fordouranium enrichment facility, which was buried in a mountain near the city of Qom. This surprising revelation fed the belief that intelligence could not keep track of covert Iranian nuclear activities, and some observers continue to see it as proof of the limits of intelligence. Earlier this week The New York Times’David Sanger wrote that the CIA “missed a large underground site called Fordo” and was forced to rely on allied intelligence services for information about what was going on in Iran. “The CIA’s ability to detect covert nuclear sites,” he concluded, “has been mixed at best.”
But it is not clear that the CIA or any other agency was caught unaware. Intelligence officialsexplained at the time that they knew about Fordo but were reluctant to go public, both because of the traditional concern about revealing sources and methods, and because they wanted to make the “strongest possible case” about the nature of the facility. Satellite imageryreportedly spotted suspicious digging at the site long before Iran started installing equipment there in 2009. While intelligence officials obviously have reason to put a positive spin on their record, no subsequent reports indicate that they were misleading the public.
Critics claim that intelligence agencies have sheepishly backtracked from their previous views of Iran. As John Bolton put it in a recent New York Timesop-ed, “there is now widespread acknowledgment that the rosy 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which judged that Iran’s weapons program was halted in 2003, was an embarrassment, little more than wishful thinking.”
Bolton may believe this but public statements from the intelligence community have been remarkably consistent on Iran since the original NIE. The Director of National Intelligence’s annual threat briefings to Congress, for instance, have stressed the same basic conclusions: Iran’s weapons program ended in 2003 but its enrichment program did not; Iran has worked hard to master the fuel cycle; Iran may seek nuclear weapons but it is also sensitive to economic and political pressure; and Iranian leaders have not made a final decision about whether to build an arsenal. Even a cursory reading of these statements, all of which areonline, belies the notion that the intelligence community is running from its previous conclusions.
For all the criticism of its performance, the intelligence community has done well to keep up with Iran’s nuclear activities over the last decade. There is no obvious flaw in its conclusions or evidence that has reversed course. Indeed, this looks like an analytical success story. The 2007 NIE had the basics right, and estimates evolved as the intelligence community acquired new information. There may be reasons to be skeptical about a nuclear deal with Iran, but bad intelligence is not one of them.
In 2002, the intelligence community produced a flawed estimate of Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Intelligence analysts had very little reliable information at their disposal, especially because weapons inspectors had been out of the country for several years. Making matters worse, the George W. Bush administration began to lean on the community to exaggerate the Iraqi threat, and it used intelligence to sell the war to Congress and the public. Despite the patchy and unreliable underlying information, intelligence reports became increasingly assertive about the growing danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s illusory arsenal.
In 2007, the intelligence community produced another controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). This time the topic was Iran’s nuclear program. Unlike the first case, this estimate was prepared under the assumption that it would remain classified, and analysts were surely surprised when then-President Bush ordered its publication. The estimate became the target of intense criticism, especially from Republicans who accused intelligence agencies of undermining the administration’s aggressive posture toward Iran. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger called it “policy conjecture” masquerading as objective intelligence. Peter Hoekstra, the former House intelligence committee chairman, called it a “piece of trash.”
In reality, the NIE was accurate and prescient. It concluded that Iran had disbanded its organized nuclear weapons research program in 2003. At the same time, it noted that Iran was continuing enrichment work apace and that Iran would have sufficient material for a bomb by 2015 if it chose to enrich its uranium stockpile to weapons grade. This prediction, which was supported in later threat assessments, has been borne out in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports and open source analyses. Meanwhile there is no evidence to suggest that Iran had resuscitated its weaponization effort at any point between 2003 and 2007. If the estimate was so naive, as critics would have it, they are at a loss to find proof that it was substantively wrong.
Despite all the criticism, intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program has been a success story. The 2007 NIE made the useful distinction between Iran’s suspended weapons effort and its ongoing enrichment program. It served as the baseline for subsequent analyses, which refined what was known and unknown about Iranian capabilities and intentions. The Director of National Intelligence’s annual threat assessments give a flavor of the evolving view of Iran’s capabilities and intentions. The conclusions incorporate new information about Iran’s nuclear program but do not contradict the bottom line in the original NIE. Iran was building the scientific and technical infrastructure to master the nuclear fuel cycle, but it had not restarted the weapons program.
Nor was the intelligence community surprised by Iran’s revelation of a second enrichment plant called Fordow. On the contrary, it had been surveilling the site for months and perhaps years before Iran started installing equipment for centrifuges in 2009. Intelligence officials have publicly and privately asserted that they were watching closely but were reluctant to come forward until they could make a convincing argument that the facility, buried under a mountain near the city of Qom, was designed to house uranium centrifuges. No subsequent reporting appears to challenge these claims.
President Obama appears impressed by this record. The White House has expressed confidence in the intelligence community’s ability to keep track of Iran, and Obama has a particularly close relationship with CIA Director John Brennan, whom he has backed despite calls for his resignation. All of this suggests that policymakers are using intelligence to help inform their judgment about the nuclear deal and to monitor Iranian compliance in the aftermath. So far, so good.
The problem is that policymakers are also using intelligence for political purposes. Rather than simply letting secret intelligence inform its private discussions, the administration is enlisting it to help sell the nascent nuclear deal with Iran. Last week, for instance, Brennan spoke about the ongoing negotiations at Harvard University. Beyond discussing general issues related to intelligence, he included praise for U.S. policy, arguing that sanctions had badly hurt Iran’s economy and caused Tehran to give away far more than expected. The deal, he said, was “as solid as you can get.” Brennan also took aim at critics, some of whom are “wholly disingenuous” for their claims that the deal provides Iran with a pathway to the bomb.
It is easy to understand the temptation to use intelligence as a public relations vehicle. Individuals tend to believe that private documents aremore reliable than public statements, and they associate information quality with secrecy. Thus when leaders use secret intelligence to justify their policy choices, they remind skeptics that they are privy to unique sources and thus deserve the benefit of the doubt. Selectively releasing intelligence also implies that more valuable information remains classified.
But using intelligence in public is dangerous. My research shows that it often pushes the community toward firm conclusions even when the underlying information is open to multiple interpretations. Leaders involved in policy disputes do not benefit from intelligence that betrays uncertainty or doubt. If a gap appears between intelligence conclusions and policy statements, policymakers may pressure intelligence officials to alter the tone and substance of their conclusions. Examples abound. In 1967, Johnson administration officials pressured the CIA to provide optimistic assessments of progress in Vietnam in order to overcome growing opposition to the war. Two years later, the Nixon administration leaned on intelligence to hype the Soviet strategic threat in order to help sell a controversial missile defense program in Congress. In both cases the underlying information was ambiguous and contested inside and outside the intelligence community, but the demands of the public debate meant that policymakers could not tolerate signs of doubt or disagreement. So they removed them.
In addition, using intelligence to win public debates discourages reassessment – even if new information appears that contradicts previous beliefs. Intelligence leaders are reluctant to review their findings after making bold public pronouncements, because doing so would amount to an embarrassing admission of failure. In the months leading up to the 2003 Iraq War, for example, the intelligence community benefited from new information from inspectors as well as new secret sources. Officials were loathe to reassess their earlier findings, however, despite the fact that it was increasingly hard to justify the earlier estimates. The United Nations and IAEA conducted several hundred inspections, but they found no evidence of active unconventional programs or stockpiles of old weapons. Some mid-level CIA officers were desperate to reconsider the NIE and follow new leads, but they were stymied. “It’s time you learn it’s not about intelligence anymore,” one was told. “It’s about regime change.”
Finally, the decision to use intelligence in public may poison intelligence-policy relations over the long-term. Right now the Obama administration and the intelligence community seem to share a common view of Iran’s nuclear program. But their views may diverge, and intelligence leaders may become unwilling to make the kind of unequivocal statements that political leaders crave. If this occurs there may be a falling out that outlasts the current administration. Past intelligence-policy breakdowns have created mutual mistrust and hostility that lingered for years after the fact.
As the administration pushes to complete the Iran deal it should keep these dangers in mind. The expectation that intelligence will be part of the foreign policy debate has already led to surprisingly specific revelations about issues including Syria’s use of chemical weapons and U.S.-Saudi intelligence sharing in Yemen. U.S. policy is somewhat ambivalent on these issues, however, meaning that the risk of politicization is low. In the case of the Iranian nuclear deal there is no ambivalence: the administration is clearly staking itself to a nuclear deal in the face of substantial Senate opposition, and it is using intelligence to help make the case. This is a recipe for politicization. If intelligence conclusions start to drift from policy beliefs the White House will be strongly tempted to bring it back into line.
The administration should also reflect on the reasons that intelligence on Iraq was a disaster while intelligence on Iran was a triumph. Before the war in Iraq, intelligence was buffeted by the demands of an administration that needed to use it to justify the invasion. In 2007, however, there was no expectation among analysts that their work would be aired in public. The result was an estimate that has stood the test of time and subsequent intelligence built on the NIE to form a wide-ranging picture of Iran’s nuclear activities. If the White House continues to use intelligence to sell the Iran deal, it risks sacrificing that record.
In their recent piece in The News, Alfredo Corchado and Robert T. Garrett sized up the state of Texas-Mexico relations and a “growing tension … undermining a long-standing partnership.” They noted that, although Texas remains Mexico’s main trade partner among American states, there is tension at the political level, fueled by the deployment of Texas National Guard units to the border, anti-immigration sentiment expressed publicly by Texas political leaders and warnings against travel to Mexico.
What explains this tension in the bilateral relationship? What are the causes that have provoked the current state of affairs? In our view, the sources of this rift can be explained by domestic politics in Texas and Mexico and by societal and cultural dissonance that is not likely to end soon.
Start with the conservative politics in Texas. Since the election of Ann Richards in 1990, Texans have elected only Republican governors. The GOP has controlled all statewide elected offices since 1998. Since 2003, Republicans have controlled both chambers of the Legislature.
It is not strange, therefore, that conservative attitudes are reflected in relations with Mexico, where people view important issues very differently.
According to a Feb. 15, 2015 poll of Texans, conducted by the Texas Politics Project at the University of Texas at Austin, the most important problems facing the state are border security (21 percent) and immigration (17 percent).
Gun control worries only 2 percent of the population. Forty-four percent said they favor deployment of the National Guard to the border, while only 9 percent are opposed. The poll also reveals that 35 percent of Texans strongly agree with deporting unauthorized immigrants, while only 16 percent somewhat disagree. Clearly, Texas’ public policy reflects the views of residents.
Of course, Mexicans have different views. According to a poll conducted by the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) in 2012-13, 45 percent of Mexicans considered trade and investment the most important issue in U.S.-Mexican relations. Other concerns: drug trafficking and organized crime (18 percent), border security (17 percent) and migration (15 percent).
The topic of the death penalty follows a similar narrative. Texans, generally speaking, are in support. For most Mexicans, though, the death penalty contradicts the Catholic principle of preservation of life (although public opinion shows the wave of drug violence and kidnappings is changing some minds).
But the biggest issue is vastly different views on immigration. To the Mexican government, immigration is a foreign policy issue. For Texas — and the greater U.S. — it is a domestic policy concern. The majority of Texans support the deportation of undocumented workers for breaking the law. Mexicans see it as a question of fairness. Mexicans believe undocumented workers are in the United States because they are needed here to do the jobs Americans don’t want to do. Paradoxically, it is the very forces of American capitalism — and arguably of Texas’ friendly business climate — that drive the problem, which the United States works to stop with walls, border patrols and the National Guard. Law is not the issue here but fundamental cultures on which these laws rest.
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz says cultures are systems of beliefs, values, attitudes, traditions and ideas that distinguish the members of one group or category of people from others. If that’s true, Mexico and Texas have very different cultures. Though they share a historical background, strong cultural differences have created ruts in the relationship. It is likely that this cultural dissonance pervading Texas-Mexico relations will remain in place for the foreseeable future.
This news story first appeared on March 18, 2015. For more information, click here.
Tower Center Associate, Yuval Weber is an assistant professor in the Department of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia.
Why the U.S. does nothing in Ukraine
By Yuval Weber, The Washington Post; March 18, 2015
The ongoing war in Ukraine recently passed the first anniversary of the highly dubious referendum that split Crimea off from Ukraine and eventually saw it attached to Russia. Over the course of the conflict that followed, over 6,000 people have died, large swathes of eastern Ukraine have been destroyed, and Russian support for separatists rendered insecure by the change of government in Kiev has gone from highly suspected to fairly open. Reaction in Washington has been equally vitriolic with politicians and commentators pushing for President Obama either to escalate the challenge to Russia by providing greater amounts of military aid to Ukraine more quickly or to come to some sort of great power accommodation instead, effectively ceding a low-importance country in exchange for an end to the conflict to a much more resolved adversary. Recent expert interviews conducted by my colleague Andrej Krickovic and I here in Moscow on Russian strategic interests, and insights derived from the bargaining theory of conflict, suggest that the current policy – doing little at the cost of watching the collateral damage rise – may best fulfill U.S. foreign policy interests by refusing to give Russia the fight it wants at the time and issue of the latter’s choosing.
For a recent paper, Krickovic and I interviewed a number of foreign policy experts here in Moscow to understand the extent of Russian strategic interests. The interview subjects clearly indicated that the war in Ukraine is a symptom of greater dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War international order. As Evgeny Lukyanov, the Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, has said, “We need to sit down [with the United States] and renegotiate the entire post-cold War settlement.” The experts further stated that the potential loss of Ukraine directly threatens Russia’s ability to pursue Eurasian integration, which is central to the country’s larger strategic vision of developing a Eurasian bloc (through bolstering the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization) to resist the consequences of U.S. unipolarity and to compete in the multipolar world it expects to emerge.
In terms set out by our interviewees, Russia seeks a “grand bargain” that explicitly identifies the role of the United States in the international order and puts limits on U.S. behavior to make America more predictable in its behavior and to prevent it from overstepping its own authority. Three tenets of this bargain that would assure Russian security include a collective security treaty binding Russia, the United States, and the leading European states; a supranational decision-making body (Security Council of Europe of NATO, the European Union, and CSTO) as previously proposed by Dmitry Medvedev that would end NATO dominance in Europe; and a “Monroe Doctrine” for the post-Soviet space that legitimizes a sphere of influence in the region. These ideas follow along Vladimir Putin’s “collective leadership” offer at the latest Valdai meeting: a new world order based on competing hierarchies of states, mutual non-interference in spheres of interest, and coordinated responses to transnational problems of mutual interest, such as Islamist terrorism. Eventually, all these institutional developments would lead to an “integration of integrations” so that a bigger EEU could associate with the European Union and other Western institutions as a full-fledged partner enjoying the same status as these powerful institutions.
These terms set out exactly why Russia is motivated to fight over the resolution of Ukraine now rather than later. By Russia’s own bloc-oriented view of the future of international relations, the failure to “get” Ukraine means that the Eurasian bloc has roughly reached its apex (Kyrgyzstan will accede in May 2015 while other regional states are seemingly getting cold feet). Facing a negative shift in future bargaining power means that it should fight now before it gets too weak in the future to mount a credible challenge to revise the international order later.
This very well explains what Russia is doing, but how can we explain Obama’s reluctance either to commit greater resources to the conflict or to cut bait and leave? Why has Obama settled on a policy of seemingly strenuous inaction? It is very likely that Obama can observe that Russia’s bloc-oriented strategy has led to the same apex, and that future decline by Russia’s own standards is approaching. Thus, to accommodate Russia in this bargaining framework would not only involve upsetting European allies and the Ukrainians, but would give a lifeline to an adversary by ameliorating the decline. Moreover, to challenge Russia over Ukraine would be to escalate a conflict that the United States is less able and less resolved to win with acceptable costs.
This places Obama in a different position relative to formulating strategy regarding a rising challenger like China that needs to be accommodated or challenged because the latter is dissatisfied with the international distribution of benefits. Russia is instead a declining challenger (by its own standards) that offers the United States a third policy course of maintaining the status quo and waiting to negotiate later from a position of greater strength. If Obama believes that Russia has internal structural contradictions (resource-dominated economy) and is externally at its peak, then he finds himself roughly in the same position as Dwight Eisenhower roughly 60 years ago: confident of prevailing in a long war or arms racing against an adversary with internal structural contradictions (command economy), but wary of entering into short-term conflicts close to Russia. Just as Eisenhower failed to intervene in Hungary in 1956, Obama is failing to intervene decisively in Ukraine and giving Russia a fight at the latter’s time and place of choosing.
The policy of strenuous inaction of helping Ukraine to prevent collapse but insufficiently strongly to avoid challenging Russia runs the risk of allowing events on the ground to run away from the United States and opens up Obama to considerable domestic and international criticism, but it may leave the United States in a much stronger position vis-à-vis Russia later on – even at the cost of death and destruction in Ukraine and the precipitous decline of bilateral relations.